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Abstract
& Previous studies have found that the lateral posterior
fusiform gyri respond more robustly to pictures of animals
than pictures of manmade objects and suggested that these
regions encode the visual properties characteristic of animals.
We suggest that such effects actually reflect processing de-
mands arising when items with similar representations must
be finely discriminated. In a positron emission tomography
(PET) study of category verification with colored photographs
of animals and vehicles, there was robust animal-specific
activation in the lateral posterior fusiform gyri when stimuli
were categorized at an intermediate level of specificity (e.g.,
dog or car). However, when the same photographs were
categorized at a more specific level (e.g., Labrador or BMW),
these regions responded equally strongly to animals and
vehicles. We conclude that the lateral posterior fusiform does
not encode domain-specific representations of animals or
visual properties characteristic of animals. Instead, these
regions are strongly activated whenever an item must be
discriminated from many close visual or semantic competitors.
Apparent category effects arise because, at an intermediate
level of specificity, animals have more visual and semantic com-
petitors than do artifacts. &
INTRODUCTION
Several studies have been published in recent years
designed to illuminate the neural underpinnings of
human conceptual knowledge about objects and their
properties. Among the more provocative findings in this
literature are reports of cortical regions that seem to
respond more robustly for some categories of objects
than for others. For instance, in an fMRI study by Chao,
Haxby, and Martin (1999), the lateral aspects of the left
and right posterior fusiform gyri were activated more
strongly in semantic tasks involving pictures of animals
or faces compared with tools or houses, and a second
region situated more medially revealed the reverse
pattern. A great many other studies have also reported
apparent category-specific patterns of responding within
the temporal cortex and elsewhere (for recent reviews,
see Thompson-Schill, 2003; Joseph, 2001; Martin &
Chao, 2001).
Such results are provocative in part because there is
little agreement as to what they signify about the func-
tional organization of the neural system that underlies
concept knowledge. Most often, category-specific pat-
terns of responding are interpreted as reflecting some-
thing about the kind of information processed by a given
region of cortex. For instance, domain-specific represen-
tations might be parcellated within a semantic system
such that different categories of objects are processed
by anatomically distinct cortical regions (Caramazza &
Mahon, 2003; Caramazza, 1998; Caramazza & Shelton,
1998). Alternatively, a given cortical region might re-
spond selectively to certain visual attributes, which hap-
pen to be more characteristic of one category than
another (Martin & Chao, 2001). In either case, the
category-specific pattern is understood to be driven
by the properties of the stimulus items themselves—
either their semantic category membership or their
characteristic visual properties—and thus to reveal
something about the neuroanatomical organization of
conceptual representations.
An alternative hypothesis is that apparent category
specificity actually reflects processing demands that are
jointly determined by representational structure, and
by the particular task being performed (Bukach, Bub,
Masson, & Lindsay, 2004; Price, Noppeney, Phillips, &
Devlin, 2003; Gale, Done, & Frank, 2001; Gauthier, 2000;
Gorno-Tempini, Cipolotti, & Price, 2000; Tarr & Gauthier,
2000; Tyler, Moss, Durrant-Peatfield, & Levy, 2000; Moore
& Price, 1999; Gaffan & Heywood, 1993). Specifically, the
fusiform may be strongly activated by tasks that require
participants to discriminate an object from many similar
visual or semantic competitors (Joseph & Gathers, 2003;
Price et al., 2003). On this view, differential activation in
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response to animals might occur because, at an inter-
mediate level of specificity, animal concepts tend to
have many visual and semantic properties in common,
whereas artifact concepts do not. For example, pigs,
goats, horses, dogs, and other four-legged mam-
mals have similar overall shapes (Rosch, Mervis, Gray,
Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976), share many of the
same parts (Tversky & Hemenway, 1984), and have
many functional and behavioral attributes in common
(Garrard, Lambon Ralph, Hodges, & Patterson, 2001),
despite having different basic-level names. By contrast,
most artifact categories tend to be more loosely struc-
tured: Different kinds of tools can have quite different
shapes, parts, and functions, and the same can be said of
household objects, vehicles, and furniture (Rogers et al.,
2004; McRae & Cree, 2002; Garrard et al., 2001; Tyler
et al., 2000). Thus, when participants must name or
otherwise identify stimuli at an intermediate level of
specificity, there may be a discrepancy between domains
in the ease with which items are discerned from their
visual and semantic neighbors.
In visual semantic tasks, patterns of fusiform activation
are known to be strongly affected by the demands of
perceptual differentiation (see Joseph & Gathers, 2003),
with fusiform activation increasing as the perceptual
discrimination gets harder. In some cases, such sensi-
tivity to perceptual discriminability can produce appar-
ent category effects. For instance, the fusiform face
area (FFA) is a region in the posterior fusiform that
responds more strongly to faces than to other natural
objects in a range of different tasks. Kanwisher and
colleagues have suggested that the FFA constitutes a
cortical module specialized through evolution for the
recognition and representation of faces (Grill-Spector,
Knouf, & Kanwisher, 2004; Kanwisher, Stanley, & Harris,
1999; Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997). Gauthier
and colleagues, however, have shown that the FFA
comes to respond to (perceptually similar) objects af-
ter participants have learned to discriminate them—
suggesting that activation in this area is modulated
primarily by expertise and by demands for perceptual
differentiation (Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore, & Anderson,
2000; Tarr & Gauthier, 2000; Gauthier, Tarr, Anderson,
Skudlarski, & Gore, 1999). It is possible that the appar-
ent category effects reported by Chao et al. (1999) have
a similar explanation: Apparent animal-related activity
in the posterior fusiform may arise largely because this
region must work harder to differentiate representa-
tions of individual animals than individual artifacts
(Gale et al., 2001; Gaffan & Heywood, 1993; Humphreys,
Riddoch, & Quinlan, 1988).
When participants must identify items at a specific
level, such ‘‘structural’’ differences between animal and
artifact domains are attenuated. For both domains,
specific categorization tasks—determining that a partic-
ular dog is a Labrador retriever or that a particular car
is a BMW—demand that the stimulus representation
be discerned from many similar competitors (i.e., other
familiar breeds of dog or makes of car). The processing
demands entailed by specific categorization tasks are
thus likely to be similar for animals and artifacts.
This prediction provides a simple means of assessing
whether the observations of animal-related activity
in the posterior fusiform reported by Chao et al.
(1999) truly reveal the kind of information encoded in
this region of cortex or whether such patterns reflect
the processing demands that derive from representa-
tional structure. If category-specific effects arise because
the lateral posterior fusiform encodes a particular
kind of information—either domain-specific representa-
tions of animals or visual properties characteristic of
animals—then such effects should be observed there
regardless of the specificity with which items are iden-
tified. By contrast, if animal-related activity actually
reflects processing demands deriving from representa-
tional structure, then the category-specific pattern
should be observed when items are categorized at an
intermediate level of specificity (where structural dif-
ferences between animal and artifact domains are
greatest). However, such effects should be attenuated
or eliminated when the same items are categorized at
a more specific level.
We tested this idea using positron emission tomogra-
phy (PET) in a category-verification paradigm, in which
participants categorized color photographs of real ob-
jects at three different levels of specificity. On each
trial, participants viewed either a very general category
name (e.g., animal or vehicle), an intermediate-level
name (e.g., bird or boat), or a specific name (e.g., robin
or ferry), followed by a color photograph of a com-
mon object (a particular animal or vehicle). The task
was to determine whether the object matched the
category label. Trials were organized into blocks, with
one block equating to one scan in the PET session, so
that (a) within block, stimuli were categorized at the
same level of specificity (general, intermediate, or spe-
cific), (b) across blocks, exactly the same set of pho-
tographs were viewed in each specificity condition,
(c) the same number of different category labels ap-
peared in every block, (d) all blocks had an equivalent
number of trials, and (e) intermediate and specific
blocks were further organized by semantic domain,
with participants viewing only animals in some blocks
and only vehicles in others (animal and vehicle pic-
tures were intermixed in the general condition). This
design thus allowed us to investigate the specificity of
the categorization task, semantic category effects, and
the interaction of these factors, using the same stim-
ulus materials and the same task across experimental
conditions.
In addition to the experimental task, the design of
the PET study included a baseline task in which partic-
ipants viewed the word left or right on each trial,
followed by a scrambled color photograph, and were
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instructed to press the left or right response button
accordingly.
RESULTS
Behavioral Pilot
The experimental task was piloted outside of the scan-
ner on 12 right-handed men (aged 19–39 years, mean
age of 25 years) to assess the relative speed and accuracy
with which healthy controls could classify the various
animals and vehicles at the different levels of specificity.
Means and standard errors for the reaction times (RTs)
are shown in Figure 1. Repeated measures analyses
of variances (ANOVAs) showed reliable differences in
RTs across conditions, F(2,22) = 8.3, p < .002, with
Bonferroni-corrected post hoc contrasts showing that
the controls were faster to classify these materials at the
intermediate level of specificity compared with more
general ( p < .03, post hoc) or specific ( p < .001, post
hoc) levels, consistent with the large literature on basic-
level advantages (e.g., Rosch et al., 1976). RTs were not
reliably different, however, for classification at the gen-
eral and specific levels, nor were there any reliable
differences across conditions in accuracy, F(2,22) =
0.91, p = ns, with controls scoring better than 95%
correct in all conditions. Most importantly for the cur-
rent study, participants were equally fast and accurate
to verify category membership for animals and vehicles
[speed: F(1,11) = 3.38, p = ns; accuracy: F(1,11) = 0.31,
p = ns] in both intermediate and specific conditions,
with no reliable interaction between semantic category
and task condition [speed: F(1,11) = 0.24, p = ns;
accuracy: F(1,11) = 0.25, p = ns]. Thus, although
participants generally find the intermediate classifica-
tion easier, there is no indication of a semantic category
effect in the ease of classification at either the interme-
diate or specific level.
Positron Emission Tomography Results
We report the simple contrast of the experimental to
baseline scans; in the current study, however, we are pri-
marily interested in main effects of domain (animal vs.
vehicle) and the interaction of this effect with task
condition (specific, intermediate, and general) in the fu-
siform areas reported to show greater activation for ani-
mals relative to tools in the studies by Martin and Chao
(2001) and Chao et al. (1999). Thus, we report whole-
brain analyses thresholded at p < .05, corrected for
multiple comparisons, as well as region of interest (ROI)
analyses based on the coordinates for animal-related
fusiform activation reported previously by Chao et al.
(1999) during their silent naming task (x, y, and z
coordinates: right fusiform, 37, 55, and 21; left
fusiform, 37, 55, and 20). The ROI had a radius of
12 mm. Note that domain effects and interactions could
only be assessed for the specific and intermediate
scanning blocks, because items from both domains were
intermixed within scan in the general condition. The
effects of interest were estimated according to the
general linear model at each voxel.
The contrast of all experimental scans to the baseline
scans revealed activations reliable at a corrected level of
significance of p < .05 in the bilateral occipito-temporal
cortex and a broad expanse of the posterior and anterior
fusiform. The peak coordinates according to the atlas of
Talairach and Tournoux (1988) are shown in Table 1.
These results are commensurate with the literature on
object processing: Occipito-temporal activation is likely
a result of the fact that the real photographs in the
Figure 1. Mean RTs to verify
category membership in the
behavioral pilot study. The left
panel shows the means for
the three specificity conditions,
collapsed across animal and
vehicle blocks. The right
panel shows the means plotted
separately for animal and
artifact blocks in the specific
and intermediate conditions.
Error bars indicate standard
errors.
436 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 17, Number 3
experimental conditions are visually more well formed
and were processed more deeply than the scrambled
photographs in the baseline condition. Posterior fusi-
form activation is commonly reported in object recog-
nition tasks relative to nonsemantic visual baseline
conditions (Malach, Levy, & Hasson, 2002) and more
anterior activation within the fusiform is commonly
reported in semantic tasks (e.g., Mummery, Patterson,
Hodges, & Price, 1998).
Figure 2A shows the contrast of all experimental
scans involving animals (collapsed across condition) to
those involving vehicles. Activation peaks were observed
in the lateral aspect of the posterior fusiform on the
right (x = 48, y = 54, z = 22, Z = 5.0, p < .05,
corrected for the whole brain) with a corresponding
trend on the left (x = 40, y = 68, z = 14, Z = 3.6,
p < .6, corrected for the whole brain). When the
analysis was focused on our ROIs, two activation peaks
were apparent in the left hemisphere, one in posterior
fusiform (x = 40, y = 64, z = 16, Z = 3.5, p < .01,
corrected for 12 mm) and one more anterior that did
not reach significance (x = 38, y = 48, z = 24, Z =
2.5, p = 0.18, corrected for 12 mm). Only one peak
was apparent in the right ROI, and this was statistically
reliable (x = 48, y = 54, z = 22, Z = 5.0, p < .01).
All three peaks correspond well to the animal-related
activations in the posterior fusiform described by Chao
et al. (1999), who report peaks ranging from x = 35
to 40, y = 55 to 59, z = 10 to 21 in the left and
x = 37 to 41, y = 52 to 56, z = 12 to 21 in the
right. Thus, the current data replicate Chao et al.’s
(1999) finding of apparent animal-related activation
in the lateral aspect of the posterior fusiform gyrus.
The reverse contrast (vehicles–animals, collapsed across
experimental condition) revealed no activations re-
liable at a corrected level of significance for the whole-
brain analysis.
The main effect of category described above inter-
acted with level of specificity. Within our ROI, an inter-
action was observed in the right fusiform at (x = 48, y =
48, z = 22, Z = 3.8, p = 0.016, corrected for 12 mm).
A corresponding trend approached significance in the
left fusiform at the more anterior peak (x = 30, y =
50, z = 12, Z = 2.5, p = 0.18, corrected for 12 mm),
but not at the more posterior peak (x = 46, y = 62,
z =16, Z = 1.5, p = ns, corrected for 12 mm). The peak
of the Category  Task interaction is shown in Figure 2B.
The interaction is the result of (a) higher activation
for animals than vehicles during intermediate categori-
zation but not during specific categorization and (b)
higher activation for specific than intermediate catego-
rization on vehicles but not animals (see Table 2).
Figure 2C shows mean-centered effect sizes in the left
and right fusiform, in the baseline condition and the five
experimental conditions. Corrected post hoc contrasts
showed that considering the intermediate blocks only,
the effect of category was significant at the right peak
(x = 48, y =52, z =22, Z = 5.1, p < .001) and the left
anterior peak (x = 30, y = 54, z = 12, Z = 2.93,
p < .05), whereas a strong trend in the same direction
was observed for the more posterior left peak (x = 46,
y = 62, z = 16, Z = 2.8, p < .06). Considering just
the specific blocks, the effect of category did not
approach significance at any of the three peaks (right:
x = 46, y = 58, z = 18, Z = 2.1, p = ns; left anterior:
x = 34, y = 54, z = 16, Z = 1.2, p = ns; left
posterior: x = 38, y = 64, z = 16, Z = 2.4, p = ns).
Thus, category effects were observed when partic-
ipants categorized objects at an intermediate level of
specificity, with animals strongly activating the lateral
posterior fusiform relative both to vehicles and to
baseline. When the same items were categorized at
the specific level, however, no significant effect of cat-
egory was observed: The same regions were robustly
activated for both animals and vehicles relative to
baseline. Finally, the figure indicates that these regions
were also activated in the general condition relative
to baseline.
DISCUSSION
Robust activation in the posterior and lateral aspects
of the fusiform gyrus, bilaterally, was observed in a
category-verification task involving animals and vehicles.
When participants categorized objects at an intermedi-
ate level, this activation appeared to be specific to
animals. For categorization of the same objects at a
more specific level, however, the region responded
strongly to both animals and vehicles, and no significant
domain effect was observed. The same region also
responded when participants classified the same items
at a general level of specificity. An analysis of behavioral
data showed that animals and vehicles were classified
with equal speed and accuracy within the intermediate
and specific conditions, so that the effect of category,
and its interaction with task condition, cannot be ex-
plained with reference to the relative difficulty of classi-
fying animals versus vehicles in the different conditions.
Nor can the task effects be explained with reference to
properties of the stimulus items, because the same 48
items were viewed in all three task conditions. Thus, we
Table 1. Peak Coordinates in Bilateral Occipito-Temporal
Cortices for All Semantic Tasks Relative to Baseline
Left Right
x y z Z x y z Z
42 74 16 (5.9) 48 78 12 (7.6)
32 90 4 (6.9) 38 88 4 (4.6)
38 56 18 (5.6) 38 60 18 (5.8)
28 38 16 (5.6) 26 28 20 (5.2)
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have shown that reliable domain effects may or may not
be observed in the same semantic task, for the same
stimulus items, depending upon the level of specificity
at which the items must be identified.
The results are important for two reasons. First, they
provide a replication of Chao et al.’s (1999) basic finding
of animal-related activation in the lateral posterior fusi-
form. Such effects have been replicated previously (e.g.,
Price et al., 2003), but with less than perfect consistency.
In a meta-analysis of functional imaging studies of
conceptual knowledge, Joseph (2001) reported a gen-
eral tendency for tasks involving animals to activate
lateral fusiform regions somewhat more strongly than
artifacts; however these domain differences were pres-
ent in less than half of the surveyed studies that might
have detected them, and moreover, category effects
accounted for less variance overall than did task effects
in the meta-analysis. Tyler and Moss (2001) have em-
phasized that there is more similarity than difference in
the cortical networks activated by animals and artifacts
Table 2. Location and Z Scores for Peaks of Interaction in Left and Right Fusiform
Location Z Scores for Post Hoc Simple Main Effects
x y z Z
Animal (Int)
– Vehicle (Int)
Animal (Spec)
– Vehicle (Spec)
Vehicle (Int)
– Vehicle (Spec)
Right 48 54 22 3.8 5.0 2.1 3.6
Left anterior 30 50 12 2.5 2.9 1.2 2.5
Left posterior 46 62 16 1.5 2.8 2.4 3.7
Note: Int = intermediate level; Spec = specific level.
Figure 2. (A) Contrast of scans
involving animals to those
involving vehicles, collapsed
across specific and intermediate
conditions, with an uncorrected
threshold of p < .01 to show
the full extent of activation. The
analysis reveals greater
activation for animals relative
to vehicles in the lateral
posterior fusiform on both
sides, with peaks in Talairach
space at 40, 68, and 14 on
the left and 48, 54, and 22
on the right. (B) Interaction of
domain and task condition for
specific and intermediate scans,
thresholded at an uncorrected
level of p < .05 to show the full
extent of activation. The peaks
of the interaction term in
Talairach coordinates are 32,
52, and 14 in the left and
44, 50, and 22 in the right.
(C,D) Mean-centered effect
sizes for all conditions, at the
peaks of the interaction term in
the left and right posterior
lateral fusiform gyri. The
interaction arises from greater
activation for animals than
vehicles in the intermediate
condition, but not the
specific condition.
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in their own PET and fMRI studies of semantic task
performance. The main effect of category observed in
the current study bolsters the reliability of the basic
phenomenon, and indicates that animal-related activa-
tion in the fusiform may be observed in contrasts
involving vehicles, in addition to contrasts involving
tools and houses (Price et al., 2003; Chao et al., 1999).
Furthermore, the results demonstrate that such catego-
ry effects do not simply reflect overall task difficulty, as
participants were equally fast and accurate to classify
animals and vehicles in this experiment.
Second and more important, the current study sug-
gests one reason why category effects are only sporad-
ically observed in these studies. Specifically, the data
suggest that category-specific responding in the lateral
fusiform does not indicate that this region encodes
domain-specific representations of animals or visual
attributes characteristic of animals. Instead, such pat-
terns appear to reflect the processing demands of the
particular task being performed, which may in turn arise
from the similarity structure of the representations
coded in this region of cortex (Price et al., 2003; Joseph,
2001; Tarr & Gauthier, 2000; Humphreys, Riddoch, &
Price, 1997). When the task requires participants to
discriminate items with similar visual or semantic repre-
sentations, the posterior fusiform is likely to be acti-
vated. As several studies have indicated, animals with
different basic-level names (including birds and dogs)
are likely to share many visual and semantic properties,
whereas artifacts with different basic-level names (in-
cluding different kinds of vehicle) are more distinct
(Rogers et al., 2004; McRae & Cree, 2002; Garrard et al.,
2001; Tyler & Moss, 2001). Hence, naming tasks, and
other tasks that require participants to identify animals
at an intermediate level of specificity, are likely to
produce category-specific patterns of activation in the
lateral posterior fusiform. Our results indicate, however,
that when the differentiation demands are equated
for animal and artifact categories, no such pattern will
be observed.
Although the studies of verbal attribute listing and
visual-feature overlap cited above all suggest that ani-
mals from different intermediate categories have more
overlapping properties than do artifacts, it is worth
noting that, in our behavioral study, animals were
categorized as rapidly and accurately as artifacts at both
intermediate and specific levels. This observation is
important, as it allows us to decouple differentiation
demands from overall task difficulty: The category ef-
fects observed in the intermediate condition cannot
have arisen simply because animals were more difficult
to classify in some absolute sense. However, this raises a
further puzzle: If animals are more difficult to discrim-
inate at a visual or conceptual level, why are participants
not slower to categorize the animals?
A complete answer to this question is the topic of a
current modeling project that is beyond the scope of
this discussion. By way of a partial answer, however, we
suggest that the processing required for word–picture
matching is distributed across cortical regions that per-
form different computations in parallel. For instance, the
task probably recruits various different regions that (a)
activate the appropriate orthographic and/or phonolog-
ical word forms, (b) activate appropriate visual repre-
sentations of the object, and (c) compute the cross-
modal mapping between the object form and the word
form. Processing in this network occurs in parallel and is
interactive, so that the settling process occurring in
regions that compute phonological representations is
partially constrained by concurrent settling processes in
the cross-modal and visual regions. On this view, RTs
result from the settling of the entire network: Only when
visual and word representations are both sufficiently
well resolved can the participant respond accurately.
Settling processes within individual components of the
network—for instance, within the subnetwork that com-
putes visual representations—only partially contribute
to the full network settling time, and hence may or may
not coincide with the total time to settle across the
whole network. There is also, presumably, a significant
component of the measured response time that is attrib-
utable to generating the key-press response. Our pro-
posal is that, although one part of this mosaic of
processes contributing to the final measured RT may
take longer to complete (and correspondingly engender
more fusiform activation) for animals than vehicles
at the intermediate level, this component may be
‘‘swamped’’ by others in the full cascade of processes
and thus not be reflected in the single RT (see e.g.,
Monsell, Doyle, & Haggard, 1989).
Relation to Other Work
Several studies have reported category-specific patterns
of responding within the temporal lobes and elsewhere.
Perhaps the best-known studies of specialization within
the fusiform are those concerning the perception and
representation of faces. As noted in the Introduction, the
pioneering work of Kanwisher and colleagues found a
region in the middle fusiform gyrus, which they dubbed
the fusiform face area, that responded more strongly
to visual depictions of faces than to other visual stimuli
across a range of different tasks (Kanwisher, 2000;
Kanwisher, Stanley, & Harris, 1999; Kanwisher, McDer-
mott, & Chun, 1997). One interpretation of these find-
ings is that they reveal a ‘‘content-based’’ organization of
visual cortex, in which different anatomical regions are
specialized to represent some kinds of visual stimuli and
not others. However, Kanwisher’s work has spurred a
considerable volume of research that has not altogether
supported a strict view of functional specialization. For
instance, the inf luential work of Gauthier and col-
leagues has shown that the FFA responds to objects
other than faces (Gauthier, 2000; see also Joseph &
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Gathers, 2003), that it responds more to items within
a domain of expertise than to items outside the ex-
pert domain (Gauthier, Skudlarski, et al., 2000; Tarr &
Gauthier, 2000), and that it responds increasingly as
novices learn to name and categorize visually similar
nonsense objects (Gauthier, Tarr, et al., 1999). Based
on such findings, Gauthier and colleagues (Gauthier,
Skudlarski, et al., 2000; Tarr & Gauthier, 2000) have
suggested that activation in the FFA reflects the influ-
ence of perceptual expertise on a flexible fusiform area
that comes to respond robustly when participants have
learned to discriminate the subtle perceptual differ-
ences that distinguish highly familiar items.
The contribution of the current work is to suggest that
a process-based account of fusiform activation like that
proposed by Gauthier can also explain category effects
in tasks that do not require very specific categorization
or identification of stimulus items. Intermediate-level
classification of animals, like the specific identification
of individual faces, requires the discrimination of similar
visual and semantic representations. The intermediate-
level classification of artifacts does not make comparable
demands, because artifacts with different intermediate-
level names do not have so many visual or semantic
properties in common. Because fusiform responses are
modulated by the differentiation demands of the task
(Joseph & Gathers, 2003), this structural difference in
category representations yields a difference in fusiform
activation for tasks involving intermediate-level classifi-
cation of animals and artifacts. When the differentiation
demands of the task are comparable, as in the specific
condition of the current study, category effects are
not observed. Similar arguments have been put for-
ward in several recent articles (e.g., Joseph & Gathers,
2003; Price et al., 2003), however, to our knowledge, the
current work is the first to demonstrate robust domain-
level category effects that vanish when the differentia-
tion demands of the task increase.
Our account of category-specific responding in the
fusiform is also broadly consistent with a variety of
computational models of visual–semantic processing.
For example, in the cascade model of object naming
from vision (Humphreys, Riddoch, & Quinlan, 1988),
visual stimuli activate localist visual representations
(structural descriptions) of familiar items in proportion
to their visual/structural similarity. Structural descrip-
tions then compete for activation. For items that have
many visually similar neighbors, the competition in this
layer takes longer to resolve, producing ‘‘visual crowd-
ing’’ effects (Gale et al., 2001). Structural descriptions, in
turn, project to localist semantic representations, which
also compete for activation. Items in dense semantic
neighborhoods have many competitors; hence, retrieval
of semantic information specific to such items may suffer
from a ‘‘semantic crowding’’ effect. Similar phenomena
can also arise in models that adopt more distributed
visual and/or semantic representations (Rogers et al.,
2004; Farah & McClelland, 1991). Visual crowding has
been shown to produce apparent category effects both
in normal controls (Gaffan & Heywood, 1993) and in
patients with visual agnosia (Dixon, Bub, & Arguin,
1997); semantic crowding effects produce different pat-
terns of errors for animal and artifact items in patients
with generalized semantic impairments (Rogers et al.,
2004). Thus, apparent category-specific responding in
the posterior fusiform could reflect either visual or
semantic crowding effects, or both.
Many investigators have adopted the more general
notion that knowledge about the properties of concrete
objects is coded in a distributed and interactive cortical
network, with many different regions contributing to the
representation of a single object. This idea has a long
history in cognitive neuropsychology—both Wernicke
and Meynert articulated distributed theories of concep-
tual representation—and it has received widespread
endorsement from recent functional imaging studies.
Perhaps most notable in the current context are the
network analyses of fMRI data conducted by Haxby et al.
(2001). To answer the question of which regions in the
ventral temporal cortex best predict category mem-
bership of stimulus objects, these authors presented
participants with pictures of faces, animals, manmade
objects, or nonsense photographs in a one-back repeti-
tion detection paradigm. The results showed that cate-
gory membership was signaled not by the activation of
discrete cortical modules for different kinds of objects
but instead by the pattern of activity across many dif-
ferent regions. Although some areas appeared to be
‘‘selectively’’ active for some categories more than
others, patterns of activation within these regions could
still be used to predict category membership for the
nonpreferred stimulus items; even when these ‘‘special-
ized’’ regions were excluded from the analysis, category
membership could be reliably determined from the
pattern of activity across other regions of cortex. From
this analysis, Haxby et al. (2001) concluded that visual
representations of object classes are coded in distrib-
uted and largely overlapping representations in the
ventral temporal lobe.
We view Haxby’s ideas as very similar in spirit to our
own proposals about the representation of conceptual
knowledge in cortex (e.g., Rogers et al., 2004; McClel-
land & Rogers, 2003; Mummery et al., 1998; Vanden-
berghe, Price, Wise, Josephs, & Frackowiak, 1996). Our
data do, however, speak to one issue critical to any
distributed theory of conceptual knowledge: What prin-
ciples govern the neuroanatomical organization of the
cortical semantic network? Most investigators would
endorse an organization informed at least coarsely by
perceptual modality, in which representations of object
color are coded near regions responsible for color
perception, representations of visual motion are coded
near regions responsible for motion perception, and so
on (Martin, Haxby, Lalonde, Wiggs, & Ungerleider,
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1995). At issue is whether there exists further organiza-
tion within a given modality, such that the properties
that characterize different semantic categories are coded
in separate subregions. Although the results of Chao
et al. (1999) have generally been taken as supporting
this idea, our data suggest that category effects in the
lateral fusiform arise primarily from differentiation de-
mands and do not reflect the anatomical organization
of different kinds of visual features. On this view, visual
representations for all different kinds of objects are
coded in distributed patterns of activity across a network
of shared regions in ventral temporal cortex, consistent
with the ideas of Haxby et al. (2001), with the added
caveat that some regions of the network are especially
sensitive to perceptual or semantic differentiation de-
mands of the particular task being performed.
As previously noted, animal-related activations are not
the only category-specific patterns reported in the pos-
terior fusiform. Chao et al. (1999) also described a
region situated medially to the ‘‘animal’’ region, with
differential activation for semantic tasks involving tools
relative to animals. This finding is significant in the
current context, because it appears to indicate a double
dissociation of activity within the fusiform. Martin and
Chao (2001) linked their finding to results indicating
that the lateral–posterior fusiform responds more ro-
bustly to faces than to other objects (Kanwisher, McDer-
mott, & Chun, 1997), whereas a region situated more
medially activates more strongly for buildings than for
other objects (Aguirre, Zarahn, & D’Esposito, 1998).
From these results, together with their own data, the
authors suggested a lateral–medial axis within the pos-
terior fusiform, along which visual representations of
animate objects are discerned from those of artifacts.
In the current experiment, however, we failed to find
any region that was generally more active for artifacts
than for animals. This may be because we used vehicles
rather than tools as our artifact category—tools and
vehicles likely differ in many of their visual, functional,
and associative properties. Alternatively, the null result
may reflect smoothing effects that arise in PET, although
it should be noted that the lateral–medial double disso-
ciation has been reported for faces and buildings in PET
studies with the same scanner and analysis routines as
used here (Gorno-Tempini & Price, 2001). Other recent
studies, however, have also failed to find artifact-related
activity in the medial fusiform. Price et al. (2003) were
unable to detect such an effect with PET, even using a
very small smoothing kernel. In their meta-analysis of
several imaging studies, these authors successfully rep-
licated the finding of animal-related activity in the lateral
fusiform but did not uncover artifact-related activity in
the medial fusiform.
Taken together, the results suggest that category-
specific double dissociations in different regions of the
fusiform are not easily replicated. Reports of double
dissociation are of great theoretical significance, how-
ever, because they suggest that category-related acti-
vations cannot be explained solely with reference to a
single process that is taxed more heavily in tasks re-
quiring the fine discrimination of visual or semantic
competitors. To account for category-specific double
dissociations, process-based theories must posit multi-
ple processes, which may be differentially involved in
different semantic tasks and which may be taxed more
heavily by some kinds of objects than others. It will,
therefore, be important to determine whether the tool-
related activity in the medial fusiform, where it is
replicated, persists for categorization at a specific level.
In the mean time, we hypothesize that animal-related
activity in the posterior fusiform is attributable to pro-
cessing demands that result from representational sim-
ilarity structure.
METHODS
Subjects
The task was piloted on 12 male subjects between the
ages of 19 and 39 years (mean age 25 years) selected
from the Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit volunteer
panel. An additional 12 male subjects (same age range
and mean) participated in the imaging study. All partic-
ipants were right-handed native English speakers, free
from any history of neurological disease or mental
illness, and not on any medication. The study was
approved by the local hospital ethics committee and
the Administration of Radioactive Substances Advisory
Committee (UK). All subjects in the imaging experiment
gave written informed consent prior to receiving a PET
scanning session consisting of 12 measurements.
Stimuli
Stimuli consisted of 48 color photographs of real animals
and vehicles, including the following: 4 robins, 4 king-
fishers, and 4 other birds; 4 Labradors, 4 Pekinese, and
4 other dogs; 4 BMWs, 4 Morris Travellers, and 4 other
cars; and 4 ferries, 4 yachts, and 4 other boats. Examples
of some of the photographs are shown in Figure 3.
The items chosen for the specific categories (robin,
kingfisher, Labrador, Pekinese, BMW, Morris, ferry, and
yacht) were tested for name agreement in a separate
behavioral study and were successfully named at the
specific level by university undergraduates with greater
than 72% agreement.
Task and Design
In each trial, participants viewed a category label (e.g.,
‘‘dog’’) followed by a color photograph and were asked
to indicate by button-press whether the photograph
matched the word. Three different levels of specificity
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were used for the category labels: specific (e.g., Labra-
dor, BMW), intermediate (e.g., dog, car) and general
(e.g., animal, vehicle). Exactly the same set of 48 photo-
graphs were viewed in all three task conditions. Half of
the trials were target trials, in which the photograph
matched the word, and half were distracter trials. For
specific trials, distracters were drawn from the same
semantic category as the probe word (e.g., if the probe
was ‘‘Labrador,’’ the distracter was always a different
breed of dog). For intermediate trials, the distracter was
from a different category in the same superordinate
domain (e.g., if the probe was ‘‘dog,’’ the distracter
was always a different kind of animal); for general-level
trials, the distracter was always from the contrasting
semantic domain (e.g., if the target was ‘‘animal,’’ the
distracter was always a vehicle).
Trials were blocked in a design manipulating semantic
domain (animal or vehicle) and level of specificity (gen-
eral, intermediate, and specific). The blocks were not
fully crossed, because items from both domains were, of
necessity, intermixed within block in the general condi-
tion, and PET procedures do not permit examination of
the data in a stimulus-specific fashion. Thus, there were
five experimental conditions in total: specific and inter-
mediate categorization for animals and vehicles, plus
the general categorization condition. This allowed us
to investigate main effects of domain and specificity
and their interaction for the intermediate and specific
categorization tasks and also to compare these effects
to responses generated in the general-level condition.
Each block (one PET scan in the imaging experiment)
included 16 trials, half targets and half distracters. Two
different category labels were used within each block,
indicating two categories at the same level of specificity,
ordered at random. For instance, in one specific block,
participants might see the probes ‘‘Labrador’’ and
‘‘Pekinese’’ occurring in random order, and following
each word, one of the 12 possible dog pictures would
appear (with half the photographs matching the word
and half not). Four items were repeated within block to
make 16 items total. In an intermediate block, the
participant might see the labels ‘‘bird’’ and ‘‘dog,’’ with
8 of the possible dog pictures intermixed with 8 of the
birds. In a general block, the labels ‘‘animal’’ and
‘‘vehicle’’ would appear, with 4 of the dog pictures
intermixed with 4 each of the birds, boats, and cars.
Thus, within each block, only two category labels ever
appeared, and exactly 16 trials occurred, half targets and
half distracters.
Following this design, the 48 items were arranged
into four different blocks at each of the general, inter-
mediate, and specific conditions, yielding 12 experimen-
Figure 3. Examples of some of the stimuli used in the experiment. In the specific condition, all items within a scan were from the same category
(e.g., different kinds of dogs, different kinds of car, etc.). In the intermediate condition, all items were from the same semantic domain
(e.g., all animals or all vehicles). In the general condition, items from both domains were intermixed.
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tal blocks in total, with the same 48 items appearing
in all three task conditions. Because of the limitations of
PET, it was impossible to administer all 12 experimental
blocks as well as the necessary baseline blocks to every
participant. Instead, experimental blocks in the PET
experiment were assigned to participants in the fol-
lowing way: All participants completed all four specific
blocks (one each for specific categorization of dogs,
birds, cars, and boats); two of the four intermediate
blocks (one each for intermediate categorization of
animals and vehicles); and three of the four general
blocks (with animals and vehicles intermixed). The
assignment of intermediate- and general-level blocks
was then counterbalanced across participants. Note that
this design provided the greatest power to detect
domain differences in the specific condition, and the
least power to detect them in the intermediate condi-
tion (in which it was predicted that such effects would
be observed). With one block equated to one scan
during the PET procedure, this design yielded nine
experimental scans per subject and ensured that all
48 photographs were viewed an equivalent number of
times within each of the specific, intermediate, and
general conditions across participants. In the behavioral
pilot study, all participants completed all 12 blocks.
In addition to the nine experimental scans, each
participant in the PET study also completed three
baseline scans. In the baseline task, subjects viewed
the word left or right, followed by a scrambled photo-
graph, and were instructed to press the left or the right
response button accordingly. Again, 16 trials appeared
in each scan.
The only difference in procedure for the behavioral
pilot and PET experiment concerned the duration with
which stimulus events were presented. In both cases,
the written category label (or the word indicating left or
right in baseline scans) appeared on the screen for
750 msec and was then replaced by the photograph
or scrambled picture. In the behavioral pilot, the picture
remained on screen until the participant responded,
at which point it was replaced with a blank screen for
750 msec. In the PET study, each picture remained on
screen for 1000 msec, and in turn, was replaced by a
white screen until the start of the next trial (2000 msec
later). Each trial in the PET study thus lasted precisely
3750 msec, and participants viewed each image for
1000 msec. In both the pilot and imaging study, partic-
ipants viewed and named all of the 48 photographs
once prior to the experiment, to reduce any effects of
priming when the item was repeated. All participants
were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately
as possible.
Positron Emission Tomography Scanning
The 12 PET scans were obtained using a Siemens/CTI
(model 962) PET scanner (Knoxville, TN). Each of the 12
scans involved a 20-sec intravenous bolus of H2
15O at a
concentration of 55 MBq/ml and a flow rate of 10 ml/min
through a forearm cannula. For each subject, a T1-
weighted structural magnetic resonance image was also
obtained with a 2-T Magnetom VISION scanner (Sie-
mens, Erlangen, Germany).
Data Analysis
Behavioral data were analyzed in SPSS using repeated
measures ANOVA to investigate RTs and error rates.
The PET data were analyzed with statistical parametric
mapping (SPM99, Wellcome Department of Imaging
Neuroscience, London, UK, http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/
spm) implemented in Matlab (Mathworks, Sherborn,
MA) using standardized procedures (Friston, Worsley,
Poline, Frith, & Frackowiak, 1995). The mean image
created by the realignment procedure was used to
determine the parameters for transforming the images
onto the Montreal Neurological Institute mean brain.
These parameters were then applied to the functional
images (Ashburner & Friston, 1997) and the image was
resampled into isotropic 2-mm3 voxels. Finally, each
image was smoothed with a 16-mm full-width half-
maximum Gaussian filter. The SPM software was then
used to compute multiple linear regression analyses. To
test regionally specific hypotheses, estimates were com-
pared using linear compounds or contrasts. The result-
ing set of voxel values for each contrast is an SPM of
the T statistic that is converted into Z scores.
Acknowledgments
This work was funded by a grant from the Wellcome Trust
(Cathy Price, principal investigator). A. Mechelli was supported
by National Institutes of Health (MH6445).
Reprint request should be sent to Timothy T. Rogers,
Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin-Madison,
1202 W. Johnson Street, Madison, WI 53726, or via e-mail:
ttrogers@wisc.edu; Cathy Price, Functional Imaging Labora-
tory, Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, 12
Queen Square, London WC1N 3BG, UK, or via e-mail:
c.price@fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk.
REFERENCES
Aguirre, G. K., Zarahn, E., & D’Esposito, M. (1998). An area
within human ventral cortex sensitive to ‘‘building’’ stimuli:
Evidence and implications. Neuron, 21, 373–383.
Ashburner, J., & Friston, K. J. (1997). Multimodal image
coregistration and partitioning: A unified framework.
Neuroimage, 5, 271–279.
Bukach, C. M., Bub, D., Masson, M. E. J., & Lindsay, D. S.
(2004). Category specificity in normal episodic learning:
Applications to object recognition and category-specific
agnosia. Cognitive Psychology, 48, 1–46.
Caramazza, A. (1998). The interpretation of semantic
category-specific deficits: What do they reveal about the
Rogers et al. 443
organization of conceptual knowledge in the brain?
Neurocase, 4, 265–272.
Caramazza, A., & Mahon, B. Z. (2003). The organization of
conceptual knowledge: The evidence from category-specific
semantic deficits. Trends in Cognitive Science, 7,
354–361.
Caramazza, A., & Shelton, J. R. (1998). Domain-specific
knowledge systems in the brain: The
animate–inanimate distinction. Journal of Cognitive
Neuroscience, 10, 1–34.
Chao, L. L., Haxby, J. V., & Martin, A. (1999).
Attribute-based neural substrates in temporal cortex for
perceiving and knowing about objects. Nature
Neuroscience, 2, 913–919.
Dixon, M., Bub, D., & Arguin, M. (1997). The interaction
of object form and object meaning in the identification
performance of a patient with category-specific
visual agnosia. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 14,
1085–1130.
Farah, M., & McClelland, J. L. (1991). A computational model
of semantic memory impairment: Modality-specificity and
emergent category-specificity. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 120, 339–357.
Friston, K. J., Worsley, K. J., Poline, J. B., Frith, C. D., &
Frackowiak, R. S. J. (1995). Statistical parametric maps in
functional imaging: A general linear approach. Human
Brain Mapping, 2, 189–210.
Gaffan, D., & Heywood, A. (1993). A spurious category-specific
visual agnosia for living things in normal humans and
nonhuman primates. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience,
5, 118–128.
Gale, T. M., Done, D. J., & Frank, R. J. (2001). Visual
crowding and category specific deficits for pictorial stimuli:
A neural network model. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 18,
509–550.
Garrard, P., Lambon Ralph, M. A., Hodges, J. R., &
Patterson, K. (2001). Prototypicality, distinctiveness and
intercorrelation: Analyses of the semantic attributes of
living and nonliving concepts. Cognitive Neuroscience,
18, 125–174.
Gauthier, I. (2000). What constrains the organization of the
ventral temporal cortex? Trends in Cognitive Science, 4,
1–2.
Gauthier, I., Skudlarski, P., Gore, J. C., & Anderson, A. W.
(2000). Expertise for cars and birds recruits brain areas
involved in face recognition. Nature Neuroscience, 3,
191–197.
Gauthier, I., Tarr, M. J., Anderson, A. W., Skudlarski, P., &
Gore, J. C. (1999). Activation of the middle fusiform ‘‘face
area’’ increases with expertise in recognizing novel objects.
Nature Neuroscience, 2, 568–573.
Gorno-Tempini, M. L., Cipolotti, L., & Price, C. (2000).
Category differences in brain activation studies: Where
do they come from? Proceedings of the Royal Society
of London, Series B: Biological Sciences, 267,
1253–1258.
Gorno-Tempini, M., & Price, C. (2001). Identification of
famous faces and buildings: A functional neuroimaging
study of semantically unique items. Brain, 124,
2087–2097.
Grill-Spector, K., Knouf, N., & Kanwisher, N. (2004). The
fusiform face area subserves face perception, not generic
within-category identification. Nature Neuroscience, 7,
555–562.
Haxby, J. V., Gobbini, M. I., Furey, M. L., Ishai, A.,
Schouten, J. L., & Pietrini, P. (2001). Distributed and
overlapping representations of faces and objects in ventral
temporal cortex. Science, 293, 2425–2430.
Humphreys, G. W., Riddoch, J., & Price, C. (1997).
Top–down processes in object identification: Evidence
from experimental psychology, neuropsychology
and functional anatomy. Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society of London B, 352,
1275–1282.
Humphreys, G. W., Riddoch, M. J., & Quinlan, P. T. (1988).
Cascade processes in picture identification. Cognitive
Neuropsychology, 5, 67–103.
Joseph, J. E. (2001). Functional neuroimaging studies of
category specificity in object recognition: A critical review
and meta-analysis. Cognitive, Affective and Behavioral
Neuroscience, 1, 119–136.
Joseph, J. E., & Gathers, A. D. (2003). Effects of structural
similarity on neural substrates for object recognition.
Cognitive, Affective and Behavioral Neuroscience, 3,
1–16.
Kanwisher, N. (2000). Domain specificity in face perception.
Nature Neuroscience, 3, 759–763.
Kanwisher, N., McDermott, J., & Chun, M. M. (1997). The
fusiform face area: A module in human extrastriate cortex
specialized for the perception of faces. Journal of
Neuroscience, 17, 4302–4311.
Kanwisher, N., Stanley, D., & Harris, A. (1999). The fusiform
face area is selective for faces, not animals. NeuroReport, 10,
183–187.
Malach, R., Levy, I., & Hasson, U. (2002). The topography of
high-order human object areas. Trends in Cognitive Science,
6, 176–184.
Martin, A., & Chao, L. L. (2001). Semantic memory in the brain:
Structure and processes. Current Opinion in Neurobiology,
11, 194–201.
Martin, A., Haxby, J. V., Lalonde, F. M., Wiggs, C. L., &
Ungerleider, L. G. (1995). Discrete cortical regions
associated with knowledge of color and knowledge of
action. Science, 270, 102–105.
McClelland, J. L., & Rogers, T. T. (2003). The Parallel
Distributed Processing approach to semantic cognition.
Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 4, 310–322.
McRae, K., & Cree, G. (2002). Factors underlying
category-specific deficits. In E. M. E. Forde, & G. Humphreys
(Eds.), Category specificity in brain and mind. Hove:
Psychology Press.
Monsell, S., Doyle, M. C., & Haggard, P. N. (1989). Effects
of frequency on visual word recognition tasks: Where are
they? Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 118,
43–71.
Moore, C., & Price, C. (1999). A functional neuroimaging
study of the variables that generate category-specific object
processing differences. Brain, 122, 943–962.
Mummery, C. J., Patterson, K., Hodges, J. R., & Price, C. J.
(1998). Functional neuroanatomy of the semantic system:
Divisible by what? Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 10,
766–777.
Price, C. J., Noppeney, U., Phillips, J., & Devlin, J. T.
(2003). How is the fusiform gyrus related to
category-specificity? Cognitive Neuropsychology, 20,
561–574.
Rogers, T. T., Lambon Ralph, M. A., Garrard, P., Bozeat, S.,
McClelland, J. L., Hodges, J. R., & Patterson, K. (2004).
The structure and deterioration of semantic memory: A
computational and neuropsychological investigation.
Psychological Review, 111, 205–235.
Rosch, E., Mervis, C. B., Gray, W., Johnson, D., &
Boyes-Braem, P. (1976). Basic objects in natural categories.
Cognitive Psychology, 8, 382–439.
Talairach, J., & Tourneaux, P. (1988). Co-planar stereotaxic
atlas of the human brain. New York: Thieme.
444 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 17, Number 3
Tarr, M. J., & Gauthier, I. (2000). FFA: A flexible fusiform area
for subordinate-level visual processing automatized by
expertise. Nature Neuroscience, 3, 764–769.
Thompson-Schill, S. L. (2003). Neuroimaging studies of
semantic memory: Inferring ‘‘how’’ from ‘‘where.’’
Neuropsychologia, 41, 280–292.
Tversky, B., & Hemenway, K. (1984). Objects, parts, and
categories. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 113,
169–191.
Tyler, L. K., & Moss, H. E. (2001). Towards a distributed
account of conceptual knowledge. Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, 5, 244–252.
Tyler, L., Moss, H. E., Durrant-Peatfield, M. R., & Levy, J. P.
(2000). Conceptual structure and the structure of concepts:
A distributed account of category-specific deficits. Brain
and Language, 75, 195–231.
Vandenberghe, R., Price, C., Wise, R., Josephs, O., &
Frackowiak, R. S. J. (1996). Functional anatomy of a
common semantic system for words and pictures. Nature,
383, 254 –255.
Rogers et al. 445
